

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

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*The United States
and the
United Nations*

*An Interview with
U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations
Bill Richardson*

May 1997

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A G E N D A

The United States and The United Nations

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

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“In this time of challenge and change, the United Nations is more important than ever before, because our world is more interdependent than ever before,” President Clinton declared in his annual address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1996.

Referring to attacks on the United Nations by some U.S. politicians and segments of the American public, the president told U.N. members: “Let me reassure all of you, the vast majority of Americans support the United Nations, not only because it reflects our own ideals, but because it reinforces our interests. We must continue to work to manifest the support that our people feel” for the world organization.

This issue of “U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda” explores the U.S. relationship to the United Nations and the views of members of Congress and nongovernmental experts both supportive and critical of the world organization. In the focus section, U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson highlights the importance of the United Nations to U.S. foreign policy. Other leading U.S. officials examine the need for U.N. reform, the problem of U.S. arrears, the U.N. role in peacekeeping, and U.S. support for U.N. refugee programs. And six members of Congress present divergent opinions on what the U.S. relationship to the United Nations should be. Two nongovernmental experts, in the commentary section, provide contrasting views on the U.S. commitment to the U.N. and American skepticism about the organization, and two fact sheets furnish information on U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. humanitarian activities.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the
U. S. Information Agency*

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

*An Interview with Ambassador Bill Richardson
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations*

The United Nations, says Richardson, provides “the best vehicle” for handling “some of the major problems faced by the United States and the world...nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, drugs, environmental degradation, regional conflicts.” Richardson became the chief U.S. envoy to the United Nations and a member of President Clinton’s Cabinet in February 1997. Previously, he was a member of Congress from New Mexico for 14 years. He has also served as Clinton’s special envoy on sensitive diplomatic missions to Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, Haiti, and Myanmar. The interview was conducted by Contributing Editor Judy Aita.

QUESTION: Why is the United Nations of vital interest to the United States?

RICHARDSON: The United Nations is a very important tool for advancing American foreign policy interests and building international support for U.S. foreign policy goals.

Specifically, the United Nations is an arena for handling some of the major problems faced by the United States and the world — problems such as nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, drugs, environmental degradation, regional conflicts based on tribal or ethnic differences, economic competition.

We feel that the United States can best advance its interests, and save taxpayer money, by approaching these transnational problems in a multinational fashion, building support for American goals multilaterally. And the United Nations is the best vehicle to achieve these goals.

In addition, the United Nations is the venue for advancing American interests in promoting human rights, supporting democracy, dealing with refugees, and furthering the causes of women. For these reasons the United Nations is a very important venue in which to deal with our problems.

Q: Of the many issues you’ve listed, are there some that will be particularly important for the United States in the coming year?

RICHARDSON: U.N. Security Council issues are still the most important for American interests, mainly in areas such as preserving sanctions on Iraq and helping to enforce the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia. Both of these are United Nations-related initiatives that involve important participation by the United States.

In addition, the United Nations is a vehicle for advancing our goals on sustainable development, on the environment, and on the promotion of human rights. We just had what, in my judgment, was a successful session in Geneva of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, dealing with a variety of issues relating to that very important principle in our foreign policy.

Where I do believe we have to move ahead, in terms of preserving American interests, is in the payment of U.S. back dues to the United Nations. The issue of U.S. arrears hurts America’s interests. Our credibility is low at the U.N. I have seen directly how we lose leverage on issues important to us within the Security Council — in the area of peace and security, for instance — when we don’t pay our dues. You can see it in some of the speeches of my colleagues on the council.

I think the sooner we deal with our arrears, the better off our foreign policy interests are going to be. Right now they are jeopardized by this lack of agreement on an arrears package that will also contain some significant reforms for the United Nations.

Q: I realize that it is up to the Congress to approve U.S. payments to the United Nations, but do you have a sense about where that payment issue might be headed?

RICHARDSON: In the next 60 days I'm leading, on behalf of the administration, a negotiating effort with the Congress that will seek a comprehensive, one-time grand bargain arrangement — one that will include arrears and reform concurrently, paid out over a period of years. I am confident that we will reach some type of agreement.

Right now we're down to the nitty gritty on some of the tough demands that Congress is making on reforms, which we, in principle, support. But we also have to make sure the United Nations doesn't feel the United States is guiding and dictating rather than cooperating and finding ways to work together on reform.

Q: You have been talking to groups around the United States about the United Nations. Have you found the American people's perceptions and attitudes toward the United Nations differ from those of Congress?

RICHARDSON: In my talks around the country — with young and old, in university settings, among business groups, grass roots groups of all types — there is genuine support for the United Nations.

Many don't follow all the issues directly, but basically the American people are internationalists. There is a vocal minority that stirs up a lot of misperception that is very active in the Congress. But I don't believe that their position is reflected around the country. Most polls show American support for the United Nations.

Q: If U.N. assessment rates are revised to make them more equitable, what the United States doesn't pay under the reassessment, other countries are going to have to pick up. How long do you think it's going to take to get other countries to accept that fact?

RICHARDSON: I believe it will be another two years

before all American accounts are stabilized and we can be fully paid up and back on track. There are other nations in arrears, but that doesn't mean the United Nations should not dedicate itself to reform, regardless of American interest and pressure. Reform is good for everybody and the United Nations right now has a reform-minded secretary general, which is good for the prospects for reform. But the secretary general still has to get the support of the member states, and some are not very eager to change.

Q: The U.N. General Assembly, which will convene in September, will receive the final package of key reforms from the secretary general. Will that be the dominant issue at the 53rd Assembly?

RICHARDSON: We believe the secretary general will have enough support for his reform package. We hope it is broad and aggressive. We are working with him on it. My view is that he is strong enough to get support for broad reforms — including staffing cuts that are needed, which will be the most contentious.

So far the secretary general has done well in the reforms he's announced that can be done through his secretariat. The others that remain have to be approved by the member states. We believe he will do well in that area.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the issue of Security Council reform?

RICHARDSON: Our position is very clear. We favor Germany and Japan becoming members of the Security Council. We don't believe, however, that our veto right should be diluted under any circumstances. We're also ready to increase the Security Council membership to 20 or 21.

There are a lot of proposals floating around that increase the Security Council more than what we would like to see. We want a Security Council that is transparent; that operates more efficiently. We're ready to give voice to more countries, but we have to preserve our strength and our rights, and that's what we're doing.

Q: How does the United States view the role of the U.N. humanitarian agencies?

RICHARDSON: We would like to see the humanitarian agencies more efficiently run, consolidated. There have been problems with some of the major refugee operations around the world. We'd like to see progress on reform so that refugee assistance is more efficient. We'd like to see the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs be more aggressive and run more efficiently; we'd like to see some consolidation. We're very pleased with the work of Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

We would also like to see a five percent cut in all the major U.N. agencies — the ILO (International Labor Organization), the World Health Organization, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization).

Q: What is the role of the United Nations in development and economic issues? Do you feel U.N. agencies should continue to undertake projects for the sake of development alone, or do you think they should only be undertaken in support of peacekeeping or democracy-building programs?

RICHARDSON: Developed nations and international agencies have to find ways to deliver development assistance more effectively and more efficiently. By that I mean we need to find new ways to help other countries. That doesn't necessarily mean direct grants; we need to find ways to involve the private sector, provide loans, make more use of the international financial institutions, and develop programs that involve training of executives.

We support the general view that the secretary general has to move some of the funds saved from reform into development projects. We don't think development projects within the United Nations should be politicized. U.N. giving and financial assistance is based on need; we think it should stay that way.

The resources are not that vast, but what is needed

is for major donor countries like Japan and the United States, U.N. agencies, and the international financial institutions to better coordinate their assistance so that duplication is avoided and there are comprehensive joint strategies, rather than separate strategies as exist today.

Q: The United Nations has been involved in longstanding disputes — such as Afghanistan, Cyprus, and even the Middle East and Palestine — that have, at times, turned the world organization into a debating society. Do you feel there is a role for the United Nations — not necessarily in helping to settle these disputes, but in helping to bring the sides closer together on the issues?

RICHARDSON: I think the United Nations has a very strong record of effectiveness, specifically in two instances that advanced American interests. First with Iraq, when a "coalition of the willing" was formed to support the United States in forcing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. This wasn't just a U.S. issue; it helped many countries. And secondly with North Korea, when the threat of sanctions by the United Nations made the North Koreans come to the negotiating table. This eventually produced a nuclear accord with the United States that freezes their nuclear development.

I think there are many more success stories. Some peacekeeping functions that work very well — Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, to name a few. Bosnia, on the whole, has worked well. Somalia is the one that is most questioned; but on the whole, although there were some problems, a lot of lives were saved in Somalia by the U.N. operation. Angola has just been completed successfully. I suspect that there will be a United Nations presence in Zaire to bring stability in elections to that country.

I think the successes far outweigh the problems. There are some long-standing operations. Cyprus has, no question, been a nagging one for many years. In Cyprus the presence of U.N. troops has brought stability there, has brought a certain passiveness to a very contentious dispute. On the

REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS

*An Interview with Princeton Lyman
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs*

The Clinton administration has a “strong commitment” to U.N. reform and to solving the problem of U.S. arrearages to the United Nations, says Lyman. A career foreign service officer, Lyman was named acting assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs in July, 1996, and was sworn in as assistant secretary in March 1997. He previously served as U.S. ambassador to South Africa and as ambassador to Nigeria, and from 1989 to 1992 was director of the State Department’s Bureau for Refugee Programs. The interview was conducted by Contributing Editor Edmund F. Scherr.

QUESTION: What are the principle areas in which the United States is seeking reforms at the United Nations?

LYMAN: After 50 years the United Nations has acquired a lot of added functions, mandates, and offices; it is now time to look at its structure and organization to make it more effective. That is the principle U.S. objective.

First, we see a need to combine and consolidate duplicate functions, ones that have grown up over the years in response to specific needs but that now must be brought together.

Second, there must be a focus on the high priority activities that the United Nations does best, and on doing them well.

Third, there has been a tendency to allow the U.N. budget to grow without a great deal of discipline. With some 14 countries now paying 80-90 percent of the budget, one has to look at whether the budget system has enough discipline.

These are the main objectives of proposed reforms, and out of this can come a United Nations that performs better in the development area as well as in peacekeeping, human rights, and other areas.

Q: Why is this the right time to confront long-discussed U.N. reforms?

LYMAN: The same issues have been raised for more than a decade. The impetus for reform more recently has been a financial crisis. The United Nations could not continue to garner the resources it needs to maintain an organization that was not reforming.

There was also a crisis in peacekeeping in the early 1990s — brought on by the perceived failures or shortcomings of peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda — that highlighted this need for reform. Again people were saying, “Let’s look at the way the United Nations organizes itself and makes decisions, and let’s make it more effective.” The world has changed since the United Nations was organized 50 years ago. More organizations are involved in the work of the United Nations and that has to be considered.

Q: Does the whole U.N. system need reforming?

LYMAN: Part of the problem is that most of the attention for reform is centered on the U.N. headquarters in New York. The U.N. system is a very broad and diversified one, including many specialized agencies, and we feel that the U.N. agencies should go through the same reform process as headquarters. These are big organizations with big budgets; some of them have already begun reforms.

Q: What is the U.S. view of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s moves toward U.N. reform since he assumed his new job?

LYMAN: The secretary general's start on the path of reform is very welcome. He has implemented some long-proposed recommendations that have lots of support among U.N. members — consolidating some departments, reducing overhead, shifting emphasis to program output, and trimming some unneeded personnel. It is an important beginning to his term, and we are very impressed.

Q: Does he have a better chance now than his predecessors had to get the reforms enacted?

LYMAN: He has a better chance. The whole concept of reform is now much more on the agenda; it is much more of a priority. Everybody acknowledges that it must be done. The problem is that he is doing it at a time when the United Nations is facing serious financial problems, and that, in some ways, makes it a more contentious process.

Q: Is it possible to move ahead with U.N. reform efforts if the United States does not pay its back dues?

Lyman: We have reached a point where our ability to get needed reforms is clearly jeopardized by our failure to pay our arrears. It creates resistance on the part of others who feel that we are making demands on an organization without paying our way. It creates animosity, which colors people's objective views of the reforms being put forward and causes them to question our motives.

People may ask if the United States is really trying to make the United Nations more effective or if it is just trying to weaken the United Nations so it doesn't have to pay more money. Clearly it is the first reason, but if we don't pay our dues and arrears, people may think it is the second.

Q: How does the United States, in promoting U.N. reform, address the concerns of third world countries that feel that support for development may be threatened by reform proposals?

LYMAN: This is a very serious problem because there is a perception, particularly among developing countries, that this is exactly what we are aiming to do — to reduce the volume and

effectiveness of the United Nations' role in development. What we are trying to do is reduce the money spent on administration — overhead, headquarters, conferencing, etc. — and to increase the amount spent on delivering assistance to people in developing countries. The United States has increased substantially its payments to the U.N. Development Program. President Clinton has just proposed making up all of our arrears to the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank.

We applaud the secretary-general's proposal to reduce the administrative overhead of the United Nations from 38 percent to 25 percent and to channel the savings into program deliveries. The idea is not to reduce the United Nations' role in development but to make it more effective for the people of the developing countries.

Q: Members of Congress are planning to offer their own ideas on what steps toward reform the United Nations must take in order for the United States to pay its back dues. What is the administration's view of this congressional effort?

LYMAN: We are discussing with members of Congress the president's proposal to address our arrears and pay them over the coming two years. We are discussing with them possible benchmarks for progress toward reform. We are engaged in a process that we hope will result in benchmarks that are very consistent with the general reform objective for the United Nations.

There is a disposition in Congress to deal with this issue and to resolve it. That doesn't mean that we are in full agreement with Congress on the scope of the problem and how to address it. You have a wide spectrum of views in Congress. The majority of Congress thinks the organization is important, that it's vital to American foreign policy, but that it needs a lot of improvements.

Q: As part of its reform effort, the United States is seeking a change in U.N. assessments to make them more equitable. What do we hope this will accomplish?

LYMAN: There are two objectives. First, to make the United Nations less dependent on one country — the United States. We pay 25 percent of all the regular costs of the United Nations. We are assessed more than that for peacekeeping. And there is a feeling in the United States, certainly in Congress, that our share should be reduced; we think that is good for the United Nations.

Second, we have to look at the way the United Nations is financed. The 95 poorest countries don't contribute much, and that is understandable. But as a whole, they contribute less than one percent of the cost of the United Nations. When you take the next 60 countries — which include all the members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) — they contribute altogether 12 percent of U.N. costs.

While we recognize the problems of the least developed, we think that this financial structure of dues paying ought to be reexamined. The world economy has changed. Individual countries have made progress. We need to come up with a better scale of dues. Our proposals will still leave the United States as the number one donor to the United Nations. The United States now pays 25 percent, and we would like to reduce that to near 20 percent.

Q: In approving the FY '97 budget, Congress authorized the payment of all U.S. dues and peacekeeping assessments for 1996, and about \$50 million more in U.S. arrears to the United Nations. Do you think this bodes well for the timely payment for the remaining U.S. arrearsages?

LYMAN: There was earlier a crisis of confidence in Congress about the United Nations, and about the lack of sufficient dialogue between the administration and Congress concerning our obligations to the United Nations. We've worked hard to overcome that. With Congress's approval, we've been able to stay current on peacekeeping and our regular budget dues over the past two years and to make contributions to the arrearsages.

This does bode well, but we've still got this backlog of arrearsages that has to be solved.

These efforts reflect a strong commitment by the administration to the United Nations and to solving the arrears problem. It represents a growing recognition in Congress that some of Congress's concerns in the early 1990s are being addressed in the United Nations through the reform process. Also, there is a growing confidence in the Congress that the United Nations will become a more effective and streamlined organization.

Q: There is resistance within the United Nations to needed reforms. What role will the United States play in attempting to overcome it?

LYMAN: We are working closely with other countries, with the president of the U.N. General Assembly and with the secretary general on a reform agenda that draws lots of support. Also, we are trying to overcome the perception that our objective is somehow to weaken the United Nations or to diminish its role in development. We are trying to demonstrate more clearly and in very specific ways that that is not the objective.

This reform effort involves many nations. Last year the European Union issued a very detailed, proposed set of reforms. After a series of seminars with developing countries, the Nordic countries issued a new report on their recommendations for reform. We are not alone. On the contrary, we are very much in accord, in general, with the reforms that others are advocating.

We have been willing and very emphatic about using the budget process as a lever for reform. Many other countries are reluctant to do that. We have felt that budget discipline is often a way to get enough attention so people will say that "we really have to do things differently, if we are not going to have the resources." That is the reality in our government and in the United Nations. And we think the increased budget discipline of the last two years has been a big spur to reform. ●

IN PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

*An interview with Ambassador Karl Inderfurth
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

In the past four years U.N. peacekeeping operations have been significantly improved, but U.N. Security Council members, including the United States, are “insisting...on demonstration by the (conflicting) parties that they are indeed committed to whatever agreement they sign,”

Inderfurth says. “Peacekeepers won’t rush into unclear situations which could cause them to fail.”

Inderfurth has been U.S. representative to the United Nations for special political affairs since May 1993 and was a senior adviser to former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright.

In the 1970s he was a staff member on the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees and on the National Security Council. An award-winning journalist, Inderfurth was national security correspondent and later Moscow correspondent while working from 1981-1993 with ABC News.

The interview was conducted by Contributing Editor Judy Aita.

QUESTION: What considerations should be taken into account when deciding to launch a U.N. peacekeeping operation?

INDERFURTH: Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25), which was signed by President Clinton in May 1994, was a high-level policy review aimed at reforming and strengthening U.N. peacekeeping ability. It was subjected to very high level attention by then-U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and then-Secretary of Defense William Perry. One of the key things about that policy review is that it insisted upon greater rigor by the U.N. Security Council in approving, reviewing, changing, phasing out, or authorizing new or existing operations.

It was the view of our government — which others shared — that because of the many demands placed on it, the Security Council had become, in Ambassador Albright’s words, the “international 911” (emergency call number) for peacekeeping. With the tremendous growth in peacekeeping operations and missions, the council had to be far more rigorous in its analysis and examination of which missions it could undertake and what it had to know before authorizing them.

PDD25 establishes certain criteria for launching a peacekeeping mission, some of which are simply common sense: ensuring that the mission is clearly defined, linking military and political objectives; making certain there is an overall political objective to be served by establishing the peacekeeping mission; establishing, when possible, time lines and end dates for the duration of the mission; getting a firm statement of costs involved so we don’t have an open-ended financial commitment; and looking at, obviously, the risks involved and the objectives to be served. There are a lot of tough questions that have to be asked and the presidential directive lays them out.

Q: Has PDD25 had any significant impact over the past three years on Security Council decision-making regarding peacekeeping?

INDERFURTH: We have seen in the last three years a far greater degree of analysis in the Security Council than in the past. I think that has meant a number of things — most importantly, better defined, better planned operations than we’ve seen in the past.

Q: In addition to its work on the Security Council, what other steps has the United States taken to implement PDD25, and what has been

the response of the U.N. secretariat and other nations to the U.S. initiative?

INDERFURTH: The United States works very hard under the presidential directive — principally in conjunction with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) — to see what steps can be taken by the United Nations to strengthen peacekeeping. The department was headed in 1994 by now Secretary General Kofi Annan, who is a reform-minded individual, and we were delighted to work with him on this effort. He worked very closely with us and others to see what steps to take to strengthen his department.

Working with DPKO and with other countries as well — we are not the only reform-minded country — we suggested several improvements in the department's organizational structure. And in a period of two, three, four years, DPKO has developed into what we consider to be a well-organized and well-structured organization with an undersecretary general and two assistant secretaries general, a situation center that provides 24-hour coverage for all peacekeeping operations, a lesson-learned unit (DPKO looks at what it has done and how it can do it better), a civilian police unit, and a de-mining unit.

A very important part of this enhancement of DPKO has been the establishment of a logistical base at Brindisi, Italy, for the refurbishing and recycling of U.N. equipment. There also has been an increase in the number of DPKO personnel — from eight several years ago to 384 today. Many of the DPKO staff are on-loan military officers from a variety of countries, including the United States, who help to professionalize the department and actually keep costs down for the United Nations.

Q: What has been the end result of all this activity?

INDERFURTH: All of the components of a peacekeeping operation which had been done haphazardly, or sort of catch-as-catch-can, before have become part of a structured organization. The United Nations now has the benefit of a better run operation, but it also has the benefit of

instilling greater confidence in governments — including the U.S. government — to turn to the U.N. to undertake certain missions.

We believe that the end result has been the establishment of a fully formed and professional peacekeeping department.

Q: Do you anticipate greater demands on the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping?

INDERFURTH: Peacekeeping has gone through many changes, including a reduction from nearly 80,000 down to 25,000 peacekeepers today. That has had, and continues to have, an impact on the way DPKO operates. The structure is now well established for whatever level of activity DPKO is called on to perform.

Even though the number of peacekeepers is down, there are still about 16 or 17 missions. So it is a far flung activity and there's always the possibility those numbers will go back up again. There is discussion in the council about what to do if the parties in Zaire reach agreement on a cease-fire. There is also talk now about sending a mission of 720 peacekeepers to Sierra Leone, if there is agreement among the parties.

One thing that is important — and this goes back to the question of Security Council authorization — is that it's very clear the Security Council is insisting much more than in the past on demonstration by the parties that they are indeed committed to whatever agreement they sign. Peacekeepers won't rush into unclear situations that could cause them to fail.

Q: Between 1992 and 1994 U.N. peacekeepers were heavily involved in conflict situations in Somalia and Bosnia, yet the United Nations now seems reluctant to get involved in some current hot spots such as eastern Zaire. Is it a case of the scars of the past should teach us caution?

INDERFURTH: I think we all recognize that the United Nations has limitations in terms of peacekeeping. What we have just seen with

Albania, where the United Nations has authorized a multinational force to be led by the Italians with the participation of a European “coalition of the willing,” is an example for the future. I think that in many cases where the numbers (of peacekeepers) are likely to be large and the risks great, we will look to coalitions to undertake the missions, but still using the United Nations and the Security Council as the legitimizing partner.

That serves a very important purpose because it recognizes that the United Nations can't do everything, but that the U.N. — with its authority as an international organization — does give its blessing to the undertaking, saying that it is, in effect, in pursuit of international peace and security.

Q: The United States owes more than \$800 million for past and current peacekeeping operations. Does that reflect a lack of U.S. commitment to U.N. peacekeeping operations? What are the U.S. intentions in paying those arrears?

INDERFURTH: The Clinton administration is committed to a well-run U.N. peacekeeping operation — and to paying all U.S. debt to the United Nations, including what we owe for peacekeeping. The president's fiscal year 1998 budget request includes funding to pay off peacekeeping arrears over a two-year period.

Q: What effect does the attitude of the U.S.

Congress have on decisions about peacekeeping operations?

INDERFURTH: Congress has duly noted the enhancement that we have made in terms of professionalizing of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Congress has also duly noted the effort that we have made to instill a greater rigor in Security Council decision-making on peacekeeping issues.

This has made members of Congress more comfortable with the direction that we're taking. All of their concerns about the United Nations are still not resolved. But I think all the work that has been done the last three or four years — and quite frankly going back to the Bush administration, because they started some of these reforms — has given everyone a greater comfort zone, in that when the United Nations is asked to perform a mission it is now able to do it better. Knowing the work of Kofi Annan as undersecretary general, knowing that he is now secretary general, adds to that comfort zone. ©

MEETING THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES

*By Phyllis Oakley
Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration*

The vast majority of the world's refugees "want nothing more than to return to their homelands in safety and dignity," Oakley says. The United States, she notes, working together with U.N. humanitarian agencies, must continue to do all it can to help make this possible. Oakley — who heads the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration — discussed the problems of protecting and aiding refugees on April 7 in New York before the United Nations Association of the United States of America. The following article is an adaptation of her remarks.

Humanitarian issues and those involving the movement of large groups of people are front and center on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It seems to me that every world crisis today involves a humanitarian aspect.

When the first U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was appointed in 1951 to protect, assist, and find solutions for one million refugees remaining from the Second World War, his task was considered to be a temporary one. Four-and-a-half decades later, UNHCR is protecting and assisting more than 26 million people who have fled war or persecution in more than 110 countries around the world. The cost is enormous; last year, UNHCR's annual expenditure surpassed \$1,200 million.

For two decades, we have watched people fleeing war, civil strife, and persecution: Vietnamese boat people risking their lives in rickety boats; Afghans spilling into Pakistan and Iran; Cambodians crossing into Thailand to avoid execution or famine; starving Ethiopians pouring into Sudan; two million Iraqi Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein's forces into the rugged mountains that divide Iraq from Turkey and Iran.

Cold War ideas and institutions did not envision such humanitarian crises nor did they prescribe what nations should do to deal with them. Unlike the doctrine of collective security, there has as yet been no accepted doctrine as to whether or how to

respond to problems like those in Rwanda or Bosnia or Albania. Zaire may be next.

In most of these crises, the world immediately turned to the United Nations, and particularly to UNHCR, to move in and take care of the humanitarian side. UNHCR has moved from a protection mandate to emergency response and does it well, in my view.

The State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration basically provides U.S. funding for UNHCR — our unwritten commitment is to contribute 20-25 percent of UNHCR's requirements — and for other U.N. agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

We work very closely with many U.N. agencies on the refugee side, particularly with UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), but also with the World Health Organization (WHO) and, of course, with the United Nations itself. A large percentage of the refugee and migration account, which is administered by the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, goes to the U.N. agencies with which we work. In FY 1996, our total budget was almost \$671 million — just over \$493 million for overseas assistance, the remainder for refugee admissions, the United Israel Appeal, and administrative expenses.

More than \$323 million of our budget was contributed to five different U.N. agencies:

- \$232 million to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
- \$77 million to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
- \$12 million to the World Food Program
- \$1 million to the United Nations and its Department of Humanitarian Affairs
- \$1 million to the World Health Organization

A total of \$110 million was contributed to the ICRC; we are congressionally mandated to provide 10 percent of ICRC's headquarters operations budget. The remainder of the \$493 million went to the International Organization for Migration and to nongovernmental organizations.

Let me now discuss some of our dilemmas.

PROTECTION VERSUS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Protection of refugees is codified in both international and national laws. They have as their premise that people should not be coerced to leave their homes. Those who are should be protected in the places to which they flee and should not be compelled to return when return would subject them to persecution.

With respect to humanitarian assistance, our obligations are not legal but moral.

Since the entry into force of the U.N. Refugee Convention in 1951, the international goals of protecting refugees and providing humanitarian assistance have been congruent. Recently, however, the international community has been confronted with three cases where the two aims appear to conflict. Which interest — upholding refugee law or preventing suffering — is paramount?

BOSNIA

The international community confronted the issue first in Bosnia. The Serbs declared their intention

to “cleanse” target areas. Lacking the means to resist the Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Croats could leave or endure expulsion or worse.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, with support from the United States and other donor countries, could either assist threatened populations to depart or wait for the blow to fall and then assist the victims. To evacuate meant abandoning the principle that people have a right to remain secure in their homes — in effect, helping the Serbs achieve a war aim. Not to assist evacuation exposed people to risk since panicked flight could lead to separation of families, loss of property, and conflict with people in receiving areas.

The United Nations attempted to resolve this dilemma by the concept of safe areas or protection in place. The tragedies of Srebrenica and Zepa proved how inadequate such protection can be.

The choice is unpleasant. Should we resist ethnic displacement and now support mandatory return, even at the risk that more people will suffer and war recur, or should we set aside these principles and keep people separated in the interest of avoiding or mitigating suffering?

RWANDA

In Rwanda the dilemma was even more stark. Two principles, both of them good ones, came into conflict. By 1996, the United States and the refugee-receiving countries — Zaire, Tanzania, and others — believed that it was time for the refugees to return to Rwanda. Resources to assist them in the countries of first asylum were dwindling.

However, the refugees were not willing to return or, as we now know, were held hostage by the armed elements amongst them. What then was the international community to do? Should it have cut off assistance in the first-asylum countries? Should it have espoused non-voluntary return? Both of these would have gone against international refugee principles, and yet how could we go on paying the enormous costs of assistance in the camps.

The government of Zaire provided no security in the camps — the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, had her own rented army. The camps became a hotbed for Hutu raids into Rwanda — an untenable situation.

This dilemma was resolved for us when the conflict in eastern Zaire led to the massive repatriation of the majority of the Rwandans who had taken refuge there. This, in turn, was the catalyst for the return of nearly a half-million others from Tanzania. Many others, however, fled westward — still under the hold of Hutu military or militia groups — and today are in terrible shape.

THE VIETNAMESE

A third dilemma we have dealt with over the past year was how to bring the incredible story of the Vietnamese boat people to an end. This story has lasted for over 20 years. More than one million Vietnamese have been resettled in the United States, and many thousand more have gone to other countries.

How were we to convince those who had been found not to be refugees and who remained in first-asylum camps to return home? How much longer could we ask countries in the region to

maintain camps and ask donors to pay the high cost of caring for them when they had been determined not to be refugees and when there were so many more urgent demands upon our resources and those of UNHCR? Only about 4,000 remain in camps in Hong Kong today and 2,000 in the Philippines.

We are working on practical management in all these situations. But, if we are compelled to choose, I believe it is the humanitarian interest that should prevail. We should find the solution that hurts the fewest, or that hurts the least. Our guiding principles for dealing with forced migration must remain our commitment to first asylum, to protection, to international humanitarian assistance, to voluntary and safe repatriation, and to resettlement when necessary. The vast majority of refugees want nothing more than to return to their homelands in safety and dignity. We must continue to do all possible to help make this possible.

In order to do this, we need to sustain U.S. leadership in the world and in the United Nations. We need to sustain concrete support for democracy and development. We need to let our allies and adversaries know that the United States will do what it must to meet its commitments. ●

HOW U.S. LAWMAKERS VIEW THE UNITED NATIONS

Statements by members of Congress

Members of Congress have voiced opinions both supportive and critical of the United Nations. The following statements, which were provided for this publication, give a sampling of some of their views.

SENATOR JESSE HELMS
(REPUBLICAN, NORTH CAROLINA)

As it currently operates, the United Nations does not deserve continued American support. Its bureaucracy is proliferating, its costs are spiraling, and its mission is constantly expanding beyond its mandate — and beyond its capabilities. Worse, with the steady growth in the size and scope of its activities, the United Nations is being transformed from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi-sovereign entity in itself. That transformation represents an obvious threat to U.S. national interests. Worst of all, it is a transformation that is being funded principally by American taxpayers. The United States contributes more than \$3.5 billion (\$3,500 million) every year to the U.N. system as a whole, making it the most generous benefactor of this power-hungry and dysfunctional organization.

This situation is untenable. The United Nations needs to be radically overhauled. Successful reform would achieve the twin goals of arresting U.N. encroachment on the sovereignty of nation-states while harnessing a dramatically downsized United Nations to help sovereign nations cope with some cross-border problems. Second, there must be at least a 50 percent cut in the entire U.N. bureaucracy. Third, there must be a termination of unnecessary committees and conferences. Fourth, the U.N. budgeting process must be radically overhauled. Lastly, peacekeeping must be overhauled.

The time has come for the United States to deliver an ultimatum: Either the United Nations reforms, quickly and dramatically, or the United States will

end its participation. If the United Nations is not clearly on the path of real reform well before the year 2000, then I believe the United States should withdraw. We must not enter the new millennium with the current U.N. structure in place. The United States has a responsibility to lay out what is wrong with the United Nations, what the benchmarks for adequate reform are, and what steps we are willing to take if those benchmarks are not met by a date certain.

The United Nations will certainly resist any and all reform — particularly many of the smaller and less developed members, which benefit from the current system and gain influence by selling their sovereignty to the organization. That is why the...secretary general has an enormous job to do: his...mandate will be nothing less than to save the United Nations from itself, prove that it is not impervious to reform, and show that it can be downsized, brought under control, and harnessed to contribute to the security needs of the 21st century. This is a gargantuan, and perhaps impossible, task. But if it cannot be done, then the United Nations is not worth saving. And if it is not done, I, for one, will be leading the charge for U.S. withdrawal.

Senator Helms' statement is excerpted from an article he wrote for the September/October 1996 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine.

REPRESENTATIVE JIM LEACH (REPUBLICAN,
IOWA)

Shortly after the United States was founded, George Washington warned the young nation of

the dangers of “entangling alliances.” Although the world in which this warning was given has long since faded, there remains an ambivalence, if not tension, in the American psyche between isolationism and internationalism, between a hubristic go-it-alone-ism and the sharing of global responsibilities. No issue better demonstrates this tension than the current debate regarding paying the United States’s arrearages to the United Nations.

As the world turns steadily toward a global economy, the United Nations represents the world’s principal arena of multilateral diplomacy in which international law may be buttressed and global problems addressed. As such, the health of the American and the world economy depends on a stable and well-funded U.N. to provide a framework for the pursuit of the universal goals of human rights, fair and open trade, a pollution-free global environment, and arms control. It is ironic that even as these basic American foreign policy objectives are progressively being advanced by the U.N., the United States remains in arrears for its peacekeeping assessments.

Many in Congress have linked the payment of our arrears to legitimate questions about the need to reform the administration of the U.N. Unattainable goals and capricious unilateral demands, however, may only add to the resentment felt by many of the nations toward the perceived American arrogance regarding the U.N.

Carefully constructed reforms based on multilateral negotiation and cooperation, in conjunction with the full payment of arrears currently owed to the U.N., would serve as a vital first step toward rebuilding confidence in American international leadership.

In the twilight of the twentieth century nothing is more naive than to suggest that the U.S. national interest should rely on the advancement of a narrow, nationalistic foreign policy that shuns cooperative problem-solving, dismisses the search for the peaceful resolution of disputes, pillories attempts at political and economic institution-building and scorns collective enforcement of the peace based on the rule of law.

The manifest limits of American power and the contrasting global reach of American interests make multilateral cooperation and burden-sharing imperative; they make U.S. leadership in an effective U.N. essential. To default leadership in the world’s principal arena of multilateral diplomacy through non-payment of our dues amounts to nothing less than strategic retreat.

REPRESENTATIVE ROSCOE G. BARTLETT
(REPUBLICAN, MARYLAND)

My opinion about the United Nations is very straightforward. It is not in United States taxpayers’ best interests to pay back “dues” to a United Nations that does not take into account all of the other assistance we have provided.

For this reason, I introduced H.R. 934, the “United Nations Erroneous Debt Act,” which now has 58 co-sponsors and the support of millions of Americans. My bill would prohibit any payments to the U.N. until the U.S. is credited or reimbursed for billions of dollars worth of peacekeeping assistance to the world organizations.

A General Accounting Office (GAO) report (Peace Operations, GAO/NSLAD-96-381) indicated that there is no U.S. debt to the U.N. GAO calculated that the U.S. contributed \$6,600 million to U.N. military/peacekeeping operations during fiscal years 1992-95. However, the U.N. counted only \$1,800 million of the \$6,600 million against U.S. “dues” and reimbursed the U.S. only \$79 million. Deducting the \$1,300 million U.S. debt claimed by the U.N. leaves about \$3,500 million in overpayments by the U.S.

Claims that the U.S. is in arrears and that the Congress must pay what the U.N. demands or violate our treaty commitment are inaccurate. The truth, ironically, is contained in a U.N. publication called “Image and Reality.” It notes that the actions of the General Assembly, the U.N. body which decides the budget and makes “assessments,” are “not legally binding” on member-states. Even if this were not the case, Congress reserves the right, under the U.S.

Constitution, to fund those U.N. activities which are in our national interest. Payments to the U.N. by the United States are strictly voluntary. The U.N. has no entitlement.

Until the U.N. accounts are resolved, the world body should not receive a penny of working Americans' hard-earned tax dollars. That is just common sense.

In an April 18, 1997 letter to me, President Clinton wrote that the U.N. should not reimburse the U.S. for these costs that he described as "volunteer(ing) additional assistance to a peacekeeping operation." This begs the fundamental question of whether President Clinton has the constitutional authority to "volunteer" U.S. resources for U.N. peacekeeping operations without the prior approval of the Congress. Clearly, he does not.

The U.N. and the administration appear to be operating under the assumption that the U.S. Congress, stung by the "deadbeat" claim, will eventually pay up, perhaps under the cover of U.N. "reform." Think again. American taxpayers and the Congress are not buying and won't pay for this U.N. bill of goods.

REPRESENTATIVE ANNA ESHOO
(DEMOCRAT, CALIFORNIA)

The United States owes the United Nations nearly \$1,000 million for regular dues and peacekeeping operations despite our treaty obligation to make the payments. America's long-standing commitment to the United Nations and its ideals is being threatened by short-term thinking in Congress.

Withholding funds is one way for the United States to send a message that serious internal reforms are needed at the United Nations. That message has been received. The U.N. already has trimmed its headquarters staff by 10 percent, maintained a no-growth budget for the past two years, and offered to make even tougher management and fiscal reforms. In light of this positive response to U.S. demands, the persistent refusal of Congress to meet its financial obligations can no longer be justified.

If the U.S. continues to be a global deadbeat, the United Nations will lose its ability to carry out missions important to American foreign policy, such as promoting human rights, controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, spreading democracy, and preventing global conflicts.

Both Democratic and Republican administrations have historically supported the U.N., but now ongoing reform efforts at the world body are threatened by a serious financial crisis caused in part by late dues payments of member states. Congress must meet the financial obligations of the U.S. to the U.N. in a full and timely manner consistent with international law and the role of the United States as a founder and responsible member of the United Nations.

REPRESENTATIVE RON PAUL (REPUBLICAN,
TEXAS)

George Washington warned America to be wary of "entangling alliances." He understood clearly what has since been either ignored or forgotten: foreign leaders will not, nor can they be expected to, do what is in the best interest of the United States. Americans must lead America, and not cede authority to international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the like.

Whether the argument is economic, constitutional, or defense-related, it is clear our nation must remove itself from international bodies and accords which supersede our national sovereignty.

We will live in secure fiscal times only when our leaders are free to lead. Americans should be wary of the international agreements and treaties that only serve to further remove elected officials from the decision-making processes that affect our economy. For the free-traders, agreements such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) are a step backward. Beneficiaries of these agreements are not small business owners or entrepreneurs, but the international corporations.

At the same time, labor activists gain nothing from these international agreements. Our national trucking laws are an example. Labor and safety activists succeeded over these last several decades in winning legislative support for strict motor vehicle standards and transportation regulations. Under international agreements, these standards could be tossed to the wind because the laws represent “barriers” to foreign truckers who do not have to meet our national standards.

Environmentalists should also be concerned. Under the various international treaties and agreements, it is likely that the environmental standards which have been enacted here could be struck down by international tribunals for similar reasons.

Our involvement in the United Nations is constitutionally questionable at best. Our national leaders have ceded powers to the U.N. that were not theirs to give. The people allow government to exist and to operate. Government cannot hand over to any entity — whether a foreign government or international organization — any powers, simply because government has no power to give.

Perhaps the worst aspect of our U.N. involvement is in our military dead. From the so-called “police action” in Korea to the recent debacles in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, American soldiers — serving at U.N. behest — have lost their lives for purposes other than defending our nation. In Somalia, a U.S. soldier’s body was dragged through the streets; I cannot help but wonder if his U.N. commanders cared, or if they were trying to find the next regional conflict or project for global social engineering in which to stick their noses and further risk our soldiers’ lives.

Our nation’s defense has been inherently weakened by our involvement in the United Nations. As our troops are scattered around the world, doing the U.N.’s bidding, our borders are less secure, and American citizens, property, and way of life are needlessly endangered. Even apart from economic, constitutional, and defense concerns, our participation in the United Nations is pragmatically a bad deal.

Our nation has shouldered almost the entire cost of the U.N., without any benefits. The U.N. repeatedly thumbs its nose at American policy and ideals. We have literally paid billions of dollars to the U.N., and still they demand more from our taxpayers. The U.N. takes the money of the American taxpayer, and then invariably uses it in ways contrary to the best interests of our nation. Whether the subject is economics, defense, or parking violations by U.N. diplomats in New York City, the United Nations and its policies are the antithesis of our national heritage, our Constitution, and even basic common sense.

We must be free, as a sovereign nation, to set our policies without being coerced by hostile international bodies into conforming to ideological interests that are contrary to American philosophy. While the U.N. is more than welcome to continue to exist, its plans should no longer include the United States. This policy is in the best interest of our citizens, our marketplace, and, yes, even the continued safety of our nation.

REPRESENTATIVE TOM LANTOS
(DEMOCRAT, CALIFORNIA)

We in the San Francisco Bay Area have a special commitment to the United Nations. The Founding Conference of the U.N. was held in our city of San Francisco in June 1945, and just two years ago we remembered the 50th anniversary of that historic occasion with a major international celebration in San Francisco.

At present, the United States Congress is in the process of making a decision regarding the payment of past assessments to the United Nations. The U.S. government now pays one-quarter of the regular U.N. budget and almost one-third of the special assessments for peacekeeping and other special U.N. activities.

In the past, the United States withheld a portion of our payment because the U.N. budget was out of control, and no officer of the U.N. was willing to take the necessary steps to cut back on inflated expenditures or to make the organization more

cost-effective. At a time when American taxpayers were being asked to accept significant cutbacks in government services in order to reduce our own budget deficit, we could not continue to pay the same proportion of an ever-increasing U.N. budget.

Clearly, there have been serious problems with the management and operations of the United Nations. As chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), I conducted a number of hearings on U.N. reform, and I have supported legislation to encourage reform efforts at the United Nations.

We have made progress. The new secretary general of the U.N., my good friend Kofi Annan, has made progress in dealing with these problems, and he is persisting in that effort. We must continue to press him to make those changes in U.N. operations that will improve the effectiveness of this important organization.

For this reason, I strongly support the efforts of President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to resolve the arrearages in U.S. payments to the United Nations. We in the United States must pay in full what we owe to the U.N. By and large, the effective operation of the United Nations serves our own national interests, and it is therefore in our interest to continue to work to shape U.N. policies that meet our national concerns. Our ability to influence the U.N. is considerably decreased if we do not pay our fair share of the operations of that organization. The only remaining superpower should not be a deadbeat.

A bipartisan House and Senate task force is working with the administration to resolve this problem. In my view, this is one of the most important of the issues before the Congress, and I want to reaffirm my commitment to resolving this problem and supporting the efforts of the United Nations to become the most efficient and effective instrument for resolving international disputes, ameliorating humanitarian crises, and increasing cooperation among nations. ●

KEEPING AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS

*By Ambassador David E. Birenbaum
Former U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

The United States has a legal and a moral obligation to pay its outstanding arrears to the United Nations, Birenbaum says. Keeping our commitments to the United Nations, he notes, serves important U.S. foreign policy interests and enables the United States to share “the burden and responsibility of world leadership.” Birenbaum was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations for U.N. Management and Reform from 1994 to 1996. He is currently chairman of the Board of Directors of the Emergency Coalition for U.S. Financial Support of the United Nations, and a partner in the Washington office of the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson.

The United States should pay its outstanding arrears to the United Nations.

That is our legal responsibility under the U.N. Charter. As the world's leading proponent of the rule of law, we can do no less.

It is also our moral obligation. The bulk of these arrears are for peacekeeping operations championed by the United States in the U.N. Security Council. When we do not pay the United Nations, the United Nations cannot pay countries that supply peacekeepers. So these countries — some of them poor countries — end up financing the U.S. debt to the United Nations. Great nations, like great people, should keep their word.

Keeping our commitments to the United Nations serves important U.S. foreign policy interests. We need the United Nations as an instrument for sharing the burden of leadership, at a time when the United States has such important global responsibilities. We need the United Nations as a platform for projecting values Americans care about — promoting a more peaceful world, extending the rule of law, enlarging the sway of democracy, protecting human rights, relieving human suffering, and supporting sustainable development.

The United Nations has not always been an effective instrument for accomplishing these critical missions. It is in need of comprehensive reform and restructuring that will help it to better carry out its responsibilities. And under the leadership of its new and reform-minded secretary general, Kofi Annan, the organization — building on recent accomplishments such as a zero nominal growth budget, the establishment of an inspector general function, staff and paperwork reductions, management and peacekeeping reform — is on the brink of instituting the most important reforms in its history. But that is not likely to happen unless the United States, the chief proponent of reform, demonstrates its commitment to the United Nations by paying what it owes.

One could offer a number of reasons for the refusal of the U.S. Congress to appropriate the funds required to meet our obligations to the United Nations. The failures of the large and controversial peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia undermined the political will to pay. The pervasive perception of the United Nations as a wasteful, inefficient, and ineffective organization provided a rationale. Ideological hostility to the United Nations and a more generalized distaste for non-domestic spending played a role. Finally and decisively, funding for the United Nations — seen as discretionary — was a casualty of the battle of the budget. After all, what member of Congress

wants to defend the proposition that the taxpayers' money should be spent for police on the streets of Sarajevo rather than on the streets of Sacramento?

Here we come to the heart of the matter. The Congress has for some time — whether controlled by Republicans or Democrats — treated funding for the United Nations as discretionary spending. But it isn't. Along with all other member states, the United States undertook a legal obligation to bear its share of the expenses of the United Nations "as apportioned by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter." That obligation ranks equally with the duty of countries "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" imposed by Article 25 and to conform their behavior to the norms established in the Declaration of Human Rights. And it is indistinguishable legally from the host of other international commitments made by this country.

The status of Article 17 was considered by the International Court of Justice in 1962 in connection with an advisory opinion on the responsibility of the Soviet Union and France to pay for peacekeeping operations in the Congo. The Soviets and the French maintained that they were not required to pay because the Congo operation was authorized by the General Assembly and not the Security Council. The Court, with the strong backing of the United States, rejected this argument and confirmed that assessments under Article 17 are legal obligations of U.N. member states.

Some contend that the United States, far from being in debt to the United Nations, is entitled to a refund. They reach this startling conclusion by offsetting — against our assessments by the United Nations — amounts the United States unilaterally spent in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations. These amounts, which substantially exceed our unpaid assessments, were not part of the U.N. peacekeeping budgets and, therefore, were never approved by the other member states. Nonetheless, these countries would be required to share them. Moreover, the U.S. support was volunteered, so a claim now to reimbursement

would amount to a retroactive revocation of the basis on which it was provided.

This theory, of course, would apply equally to all U.N. member states. We are not the only country that supports U.N. peacekeeping by providing, on a voluntary basis, a range of services outside the peacekeeping budget. They would all send the bill to the United Nations, and the United States — which currently is assessed 31 percent of U.N. peacekeeping costs — would get dunned for the lion's share. For example, we could expect a bill for the Italian operation in Albania. We would be called on to pay it, even though we had never seen, let alone approved, the budget for the operation. In the process, the peacekeeping budget would be turned into a credit card for member states, all budgetary discipline would be destroyed, and U.N. peacekeeping would be decimated.

This is not what the American people want. According to several recent public opinion polls, support for the United Nations, which reached a high point of 77 percent in the aftermath of the Gulf War, has stabilized at around 65 percent — well above NATO, the Congress, and the U.S. Court system. What is so noteworthy about this record is its constancy, regardless of the failures in Somalia and Bosnia, and no matter who did the polling.

The message is unmistakable — the American people do not want "to stop the world and get off." But neither are they prepared "to bear any burden and pay any price." They see the United Nations as a very useful instrument for sharing the burden and responsibility of world leadership and projecting American values.

President Clinton is working with the Congress on a plan to pay our arrears over a two-year period. The plan would require action by the Congress this year to appropriate the funds. There is no time to lose. If we fail to act in 1997, after prevailing on our choice for U.N. secretary general, the reaction of other countries to a continued failure to pay our arrears is likely to trigger a downward cycle of retaliation and

retribution. This can only have a negative resonance in Congress. In the meantime, the United Nations' financial crisis can only worsen, calling into question the organization's very existence.

That is why a number of former government officials and non-governmental organizations have taken the initiative to form a new group — the Emergency Coalition for U.S. Financial Support of the United Nations — to work for the payment of

U.S. arrears to the United Nations. The mission of the Emergency Coalition is to translate public support for the United Nations into political action in the Congress. This mission is endorsed by some 100 organizations and a bipartisan leadership council of 40, including all former secretaries of state; former members of Congress of both parties; and business, labor, professional, religious, and civic leaders. We are committed to accomplishing our objective this year. ©

AMERICA'S SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS

*By John R. Bolton
Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute*

The skepticism about the United Nations being voiced today by many Americans, including members of Congress, is rooted in American history and a belief in individual liberty, Bolton says. These opinions "must be understood by policy makers in other countries," he says, to give them "realistic expectations" about the important but limited role the United Nations can play in international affairs in the foreseeable future. Bolton is the senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute. During the Bush administration, he was assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs.

For many around the world, including close friends and allies of the United States, the skepticism of many Americans, especially members of Congress, about the United Nations is puzzling. In virtually every other nation, support for the United Nations at both the popular and policymaking levels is almost unquestioned, at least rhetorically. According to the conventional wisdom, assessed contributions are paid regularly and fully, many people aspire to work in U.N. agencies, and the United Nations is perceived as a higher and better institution than the nation-state.

The contrasting attitudes of American skeptics are unique to the United States, deep-rooted, and will not change any time in the near future. Skepticism about the United Nations is another aspect of what scholars have termed "American exceptionalism," the idea that the United States is, simply stated, different from other countries.

I completely agree, and I would like to explain here why that difference accounts for the opposition and hesitancy about the United Nations being voiced in Congress and among segments of the American public. I strongly believe that these opinions must be better understood by policy makers in other countries, who do themselves, and even the United Nations, a grave disservice by listening only to American supporters of the United Nations.

Failure to understand the opinions of American critics leads inevitably to the wrongheaded view that the problems facing the United Nations today are primarily monetary, caused by the fact that the United States and other countries are withholding part of their assessed contributions. In fact, the Clinton administration itself seems to assert that, if only Congress would appropriate enough money, reform would sweep the United Nations. But this facile "solution" does not take into account the fact that the U.N.'s real problem today is a crisis of legitimacy, not of money, and it was caused, in part, by grave doubts about the world organization within the United States.

First, the entire history of the United States, from the first colonists through the Revolution, and forward until today, has been infused with a distrust of government and a belief in individual liberty. The United States is a land of lower taxes, more private property, less government regulation and subsidy, greater freedom of speech and press, more toleration of diverse religious expression, and on and on. Although other individual countries may best the United States in one or another of these categories, in the aggregate, there is no real contest.

Because Americans generally are skeptical about their own government, can it be any surprise that many are less than enthusiastic about the United Nations, an organization that includes 184 other

governments? Moreover, the principle business of the United Nations is governmental business, legitimately so in most cases, but it is certainly rare to find genuine capitalists walking the U.N. halls. This deep philosophical disjunction between the prevailing ethos of the United Nations and the fundamental American approach to governance is not something that will change in the foreseeable future.

Secondly, Americans well remember the abuse heaped upon them, their country, and their values at the United Nations during the period 1960-90. Although it was member governments heaping the abuse, not the United Nations as an organization, the image created is durable. One can say “the world has changed,” as indeed it dramatically has since those days, but the hostility engendered over approximately three decades will not dissipate overnight.

Consider two examples. In 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379, which branded “Zionism” as a form of “racism.” For an overwhelming majority of Americans, this resolution represented such a fundamental repudiation of the U.N.’s basic principles that U.S. withdrawal became a viable alternative to being subject to endless, repetitive unthinking abuse. Indeed, it took 16 years until, after much effort, the Bush administration in 1991 was able to obtain repeal of the repulsive language of Resolution 3379 in 1991.

The other example is the concept of the “New International Economic Order” (supplemented by its close cousin, the “New World Information and Communication Order”). Although the New International Economic Order had many policy aspects, the one most widely understood in the United States was the notion that the developed world had an obligation to transfer resources to the Third World. Not only was the “obligation” itself rejected by the United States, on a broad bipartisan basis, but so too was the underlying economic theory that ascribed the problems of the less developed world to the capitalist system. While the New International Economic Order now lies buried, its memory lives in Washington.

Thirdly, even in more recent times, the United Nations has been associated with major policy failures that have made it an unattractive vehicle through which to conduct American foreign policy. In the area of peacekeeping, for instance, profoundly important American foreign policy priorities have run contrary to peacekeeping missions mandated by the Security Council. While these missions, such as Somalia, may have been supported at the time by the administration in power, they are now unlikely to be supported by congressional majorities in the near future.

In the case of Somalia, the Clinton administration wanted to test out its new United Nations policy initiative of “assertive multilateralism” — an approach that was intended to distinguish the administration dramatically from the Bush administration’s less forward-leaning policy. Accordingly, President Clinton endorsed the so-called “nation building” approach in Somalia, involving a large and intrusive U.N. presence, strongly and visibly supported by American military and high-level political participation.

However, when 18 American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu, President Clinton’s policy of “assertive multilateralism” also died. Congress erupted in criticism, and the administration could not even adequately articulate what its Somalia policy was.

Even the fate of former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali demonstrates the difficulties the United Nations faces in contemporary American politics. A fair outside observer would conclude that Boutros-Ghali was prepared to follow the American policy lead on “assertive multilateralism” in 1993. Subsequently, however, President Clinton turned away from that policy, and Boutros-Ghali was left, in effect, out on a limb.

When Boutros-Ghali was later subjected to criticism within the United States for his leadership of the United Nations, President Clinton promised to veto his re-election. The obvious fact that he was competing with Republican U.N. skeptics demonstrates compellingly where President

Clinton thought the balance of congressional opinion was on that issue, and on the United Nations generally.

What, then, does the foregoing analysis mean for the United Nations, and for America's role within the organization? It means primarily that the rest of the world should have realistic expectations that the United Nations has a limited role to play in international affairs for the foreseeable future. While that role can be important, it must be seen in perspective. Thus, during the Persian Gulf crisis, the U.N. Security Council served as a critical element in developing the global coalition that opposed and reversed Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. Not since the Korean War had the United Nations been so central to the handling of a major international crisis, and never before had American diplomacy been so focused on the United Nations. Unfortunately, however, many people drew the wrong lessons from the U.N.'s role in the Persian Gulf, thus contributing in part to the debacle in Somalia.

I believe that the United Nations can be a useful instrument in the conduct of American foreign policy. That is why, for example, even as a private citizen, I am willing to assist my former boss, former Secretary of State Jim Baker, in his capacity as the U.N. secretary general's recently appointed personal envoy to assess the situation in the Western Sahara. Secretary Baker and I met with Kofi Annan on April 2, and we will be travelling to the region, at the secretary general's request, to assess the situation there, and to make recommendations to him and the Security Council.

No one, however, should be under any illusions that American support for the United Nations as one of several options for implementing American foreign policy translates into unlimited support for a wider variety of other U.N. roles. That is not true now, and it will not be true for a long time to come, if ever. ©

FACT SHEET: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Includes State Department data on U.S. Contributions

The United Nations has conducted a total of 42 peacekeeping operations, 15 in the 40-year period between 1948 and 1988, and the other 27 since 1989. In 1995, some 60,000 personnel were serving in 17 missions at an annual cost of about \$3,500 million; in 1996 the number dropped to 26,000 military and civilian personnel in 16 operations with a total annual cost of about \$1,600 million.

Peacekeeping missions are approved by the U.N. Security Council based on plans and costs developed by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Operating costs for the missions are borne by all 185 U.N. member states on a scale of assessments set by the U.N. General Assembly. The scale is calculated using each country's total national income relative to that of other nations — a formula that is similar to the one used to determine assessments for the regular U.N. budget.

The five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are assessed at 20 percent above the basic scale. The United States is assessed the largest amount of any country — 25 percent of the U.N. regular budget and 31 percent of U.N. peacekeeping costs. The U.S. Congress — in legislation that took effect October 1, 1995 —

limited the U.S. payment to no more than 25 percent of peacekeeping costs; the amount of the U.S. assessment is currently under negotiation between the United States and the United Nations. The next highest contributors to U.N. peacekeeping are Japan (15.5 percent), Germany (9 percent), France (7.9 percent), the United Kingdom (6.6 percent), and the Russian Federation (5.5 percent). Most countries are assessed less than 0.1 percent of the costs.

Following is a list of the 17 U.N. peacekeeping missions that were in operation as of April 8, 1997, including the amount of the fiscal year 1996 U.S. assessment for each of them, and the contributions of U.S. personnel as of March 31, 1997. The mission descriptions and personnel data were obtained from the United Nations. The assessment amounts were provided by the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs. U.S. assessments are shown at the U.S. mandated payment rate of 25 percent rather than the U.N. rate of 31 percent with the exception of UNTSO and UNMOGIP, which are funded in the U.N. regular budget for which the United States is assessed at a 25 percent rate.

Peacekeeping Operation	Location	Date Established	Current Mandate (Security Council Resolution - SCR)	Personnel Strength (as of 31 Mar 1997)	U.N. Assessments (Fiscal Year 1996)	U.S. Share of Assessments (Fiscal Year 1996)	U.S. Personnel (as of 31 March 1997)
UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)	Middle East	June 1948	Ongoing	169 Observers	\$27.5 million	\$6.9 million	3 Military Observers
UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India & Pakistan)	India/ Pakistan	January 1949	Ongoing	42 Observers	\$6.4 million	\$1.6 million	—
UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)	Cyprus	March 1964	30 June 1997 (SCR 1092)	35 Police 1,162 Troops	\$23.4 million	\$5.8 million	—
UNDOF (UN Disengagement Force)	Syrian Golan Heights	June 1974	31 May 1997 (SCR 1081)	1,032 Troops	\$31.4 million	\$7.8 million	—
UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)	Southern Lebanon	March 1978	31 July 1997 (SCR 1095)	4,473 Troops	\$126.7 million	\$31.8 million	—
UNIKOM (UN Iraq/ Kuwait Observer Mission)	Iraq/ Kuwait	April 1991	6 October 1997 (SC/1997/286)	891 Troops 197 Observers	\$20.7 million	\$3.5 million	11 Military Observers
MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)	Western Sahara	September 1991	31 May 1997 (SCR 1084)	9 Police 26 Troops 248 Observers	\$58.1 million	\$13.9 million	15 Military Observers
UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia)	Georgia	August 1993	31 July 1997 (SCR 1096)	120 Observers	\$17.6 million	\$3.8 million	4 Military Observers
UNOMIL (UN Observer Mission in Liberia)	Liberia	September 1993	30 June 1997 (SCR 1100)	7 Troops 84 Observers	\$21.9 million	\$5.4 million	—
UNSMIH (UN Support Mission in Haiti)	Haiti	July 1996	31 July 1997 (SCR 1086)	268 Police 1,281 Troops	\$179.8 million	\$39.9 million	36 Police
UNMOT (UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan)	Tajikistan	December 1994	15 June 1997 (SCR 1099)	24 Observers	\$8 million	\$1.9 million	—
UNAVEM III (UN Angola Verification Mission)	Angola	February 1995	16 April 1997 (SCR 1102)	262 Police 4,942 Troops 356 Observers	\$299.3 million	\$74.7 million	—
UNPF (UN Peace Forces)	Former Yugoslavia	March 1995	(Being phased out)	69 Troops	\$89.5 million	\$22.4 million	—

Peacekeeping Operation	Location	Date Established	Current Mandate (Security Council Resolution - SCR)	Personnel Strength (as of 31 Mar 1997)	U.N. Assessments (Fiscal Year 1996)	U.S. Share of Assessments (Fiscal Year 1996)	U.S. Personnel (as of 31 March 1997)
UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment Force)	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	March 1995	31 May 1997 (SCR 1082)	26 Police 1,039 Troops 35 Observers	\$47 million	\$11.8 million	498 Troops
UNMIBH (UN Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina; Int'l Police Task Force)	Bosnia & Herzegovina	December 1995	21 Dec 1997 (SCR 1088)	1,579 Police 5 Troops	\$115 million	\$28.7 million	170 Police
UNTAES (UN Transitional Admin. for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja & Western Sirmium)	Croatia	January 1996	15 July 1997 (SCR 1079)	408 Police 4,749 Troops 100 Observers	\$234.8 million	\$58.7 million	46 Police 6 Troops
UNMOP (UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka)	Croatia	January 1996	15 July 1997 (SCR 1093)	28 Observers	Projected cost included in UNMIBH	—	—
MINUGUA (UN Mission in Guatemala)	Guatemala	January 1997	3 June 1997 (SCR 1094)	50 Police 145 Observers	(To be determined)	—	5 Military Observers
17 Operations*	TOTALS			2,637 Police 19,676 Troops 1,548 Observers	\$1,363.9 million	\$332.8 million	252 Civilian Police 504 Troops 38 Military Observers

* (Does not include UNPF, which is being phased out.)

FACT SHEET: UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

Includes White House data on U.S. Contributions

Effective international humanitarian assistance requires planning, coordination, logistics, diplomacy, and fund-raising. The United Nations plays a major role in all these fields, coordinated through the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

The United Nations provides humanitarian assistance primarily through its six operational agencies.

Between June 1992 and June 1995, the United Nations launched 52 consolidated appeals to finance programs aimed at helping an estimated 180 million people in some 30 countries. Total funding sought amounted to some \$11,400 million, of which \$7,300 million was received.

OPERATIONAL AGENCIES

The following information is based on a report by the president to Congress for the year 1995, which was released by the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs in November 1996.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO)

The FAO was established in 1945 in Rome to promote enhanced food security through improved nutrition and expanded production and distribution of food and agricultural products, and to improve the lives of rural populations.

The United States and other major contributors continue to encourage FAO to be more active in the system-wide U.N. reform process and more transparent in its decision-making. Given the austere outlook for funding for international organizations, the United States fought for and achieved a significant reduction in the 1996-1997 budget from the previous biennium. The resulting

\$650 million budget represents a significant step toward ensuring greater transparency and member control over FAO's budget.

U.S. Contribution: FAO's total operating funds are derived solely from its regular program budget, funded through the assessed contributions of its members based on the U.N. assessment scale, and from extrabudgetary activities carried out with the U.N. Development Program, other international development organizations, and bilateral trust fund donors. The United States was assessed \$78,600,000 for calendar year 1995 to reflect its 25 percent share.

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)

UNICEF, which was founded in 1946 to meet the emergency needs of children in the aftermath of World War II, continues to provide emergency assistance for children and mothers affected by natural and man-made disasters in places such as Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, the Sudan, and Afghanistan. But over the years UNICEF has evolved to become primarily a development agency seeking long-term solutions for needy children and mothers in developing countries around the world.

The links between UNICEF and the United States are extensive and strong. Both at headquarters and in the field, health and education specialists from UNICEF, the U.S. government, and American nongovernmental organizations work together on child survival and developmental activities.

U.S. Contribution: The U.S. government, in 1995, contributed \$100 million to UNICEF's core programs, making the United States once again UNICEF's largest donor. The U.S. government also provided \$28.5 million for supplementary and emergency programs in 1995, and the U.S. National

Committee, a nongovernmental organization, provided \$13.8 million netted from sales of UNICEF greeting cards and related products.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP)

UNDP is a voluntary fund that finances the world's largest multilateral program of grant technical assistance to developing countries, with increasing emphasis on the least developed countries and on building national capacity to manage development activities. All told, it funds approximately \$1,000 million in grant technical assistance per year for programs aimed at good governance, reconstruction of war-torn societies, and the elimination of poverty.

U.S. Contribution: In 1995 the United States contributed \$113 million, or 12 percent of total government contributions of \$925 million, to UNDP's core resources, making the United States UNDP's largest donor.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, established in 1951, carries out two main functions: to provide international protection to refugees and to seek durable solutions to their problems. Since its establishment, UNHCR has helped more than 30 million refugees to start a new life.

U.S. Contribution: The United States is the leading individual contributor of humanitarian assistance to refugees around the world. In fiscal year 1997, the level of congressional appropriation is approximately \$650 million, \$468 million of which is available for assistance programs. The funding is contributed primarily through international organizations, chief among which is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP)

WFP is the U.N. system's principal vehicle for multilateral food aid, including emergency food

intervention and grant development assistance. Established in 1963 in Rome under U.N. and FAO auspices, WFP uses commodities and cash provided by donor countries to support social and economic development, protracted refugee and displaced persons projects, and emergency food assistance in natural disaster or man-made crisis situations.

WFP operates exclusively from voluntary contributions of commodities and cash donated by governments. For 1995 WFP collected \$1,600 million, two-thirds contributed as commodities and one-third in cash.

U.S. Contribution: The United States gave almost a third of the 1995 total: \$486 million in commodities and transport costs, consisting largely of \$428 million in USAID-administered Public Law 480 (Farm Bill) Title II funds, an additional \$15.5 million from other USAID resources, and \$37.4 million via the State Department.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

Major attention in 1995 was given to U.S. efforts to bring about reduction of the WHO budget. WHO said it needed an increase of 16.24 percent over the 1994-1995 budget in order to provide the same level of health programs. Because of uncertainty about U.S. appropriation levels and the ability of other members to meet assessments, the United States said there should be no growth at all in the budget. After extended negotiations, the World Health Assembly — the WHO Executive Board — approved an effective working budget of \$842.7 million for 1996-1997, an increase of 2.5 percent.

U.S. Contribution: Assessments for the United States were set at \$107.4 million for each year of the new biennium. The U.S. delegation said it was pleased at the lower budget level, but could not join the consensus due to concern about the U.S. ability to pay assessments. At the end of the year, the United States had paid WHO \$10.4 million of a \$104.3 million assessment for calendar year 1995. In addition, the United States owed \$13.2 million for years prior to 1995. ©

The United States and the United Nations
KEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that USIS assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below which reside solely with the providers.

Background on the United Nations
<http://www.pbs.org/tal/un/background.html>

Cato Handbook for Congress: The United Nations
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-51.html>

The Changing United Nations
<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/UN/>

Facts About the United Nations
<http://www.un.org/News/facts/>

Focus on the UN: UN Changes for the Better
<http://www.state.gov/www/issues/unchange.html>

Foreign Affairs Envoy: United Nations
http://foreignaffairs.org/envoy/top_un.html

Hieros Gamos United Nations
<http://www.hg.org/unitednations.html>

Mandate for Leadership IV: Chapter 20: Reforming and Working with the United Nations
<http://www.heritage.org:80/heritage/mandate/ch20/chapt20.html>

A Miasma of Corruption: The UN at 50
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-253.html>

Re-form: The Bulletin of United Nations Reform
<http://www.un.org/reform/story.htm>

UNESCO Home Page - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<http://www.unesco.org/index.html>

United Nations and International Organizations
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/#U_S_Participation

United Nations Association of the United States of America
<http://www.unausa.org/>

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United Nations Scholars' Workstation Home Page
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United Nations Volunteers
<http://suna.unv.org/>

The U.S. at the UN — What's in it for Americans?
<http://www.undp.org/missions/usa/>

U.S. Committee for UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund)
<http://www.charity.org/unicef.html>

U.S. Delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights
<http://www3.itu.int/MISSIONS/US/rights.html>

U.S. Views on UN Reform
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/un_reform.html

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The United States and the United Nations ARTICLE ALERT

Kaysen, Carl; Rathjens, George W. SEND IN THE TROOPS: A UN FOREIGN LEGION (The Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 208-228)
The authors — both members of the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology — propose the creation of a standing U.N. military force to improve the world community's rapid response capability to humanitarian or civil unrest. To test this hypothesis, the authors consider whether the availability of such a force would have made significant differences in the effectiveness of past U.N. interventions in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the Congo.

Helms, Jesse. SAVING THE U.N.: A CHALLENGE TO THE NEXT SECRETARY-GENERAL (Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5, September/October, 1996, pp. 2-7)
The United Nations has been expanding the scope of its activities well beyond its original mandate and capabilities, and if such a trend continues it represents a threat to the national interests of the United States, contends Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Ironically, he notes, the United States remains the largest financial supporter of the United Nations, contributing \$3.5 billion annually. But "if the United Nations is not clearly on the path of real reform well before the year 2000," he says, "then I believe the United States should withdraw" from U.N. membership.

UNITED NATIONS FUNDING: FINANCIAL BURDEN-SHARING BY MEMBER STATES (Congressional Digest, vol. 76, no. 1, January 1997, pp. 9-10, 32)

This article, prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), details how financial assessments for United Nations members — including participation in specialized agencies, voluntary funds and programs, and peacekeeping operations — are calculated.

Because some member nations do not pay, or pay assessments late, the CRS notes, the United Nations "has had to borrow across accounts, draw down reserves, postpone payments and commitments, and practice what might be described as 'creative bookkeeping.'"

Williams, Ian. HELMS'S COFFEE FOR KOFI (The Nation, vol. 264, no. 8, March 3, 1997, pp: 21-25)
Williams notes that the United States favored Kofi Annan as U.N. secretary general and implied that it would not pay its arrearages to the United Nations if he were not elected. However, he says, now that Annan has the position, Senator Jesse Helms wants organizational reforms before payment is made.

Kitfield, James. NOT-SO-UNITED (National Journal, vol. 29, no. 2, January 11, 1997, pp.69-72)
Kitfield says the United States vetoed a second term for U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali because he moved too slowly initiating U.N. reforms. The increased U.N. role in peacekeeping has increased budget necessities, and an oversized, inefficient U.N. bureaucracy has left Congress disillusioned, he notes. Meanwhile, the United States's debt to the United Nations, combined with its open complaints about inefficiency, have drawn much criticism from its closest allies.

REWORKING THE UN (The Economist, vol.342, issue 8004, February 15, 1997, p. 17)
This editorial discusses the need for U.N. reform, suggesting likely cuts in costs and staff. It says new challenges face the United Nations in economic and social services areas, while at the same time it must address the need for deregulation and streamlining of the secretariat and other U.N. agencies.

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the home page of the U.S. Information Service:
<http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>